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THE DYNAMICS OF ENTREPRENEURIAL NETWORKS IN A TRANSITION
ECONOMY: THE CASE OF RUSSIA
ABSTRACT
The dynamics of personal networks of entrepreneurs in Russia are explored in this
paper. Drawing on the social embeddedness perspective and social network theory, I
examine the impacts of initial network range, previous occupational status of
entrepreneurs and firm performance on the changes in structural, relational and resource
dimensions of entrepreneurial social capital over time. The face-to-face interviews with
75 Russian entrepreneurs in 1995 and the follow-up study in 1999 comprise the empirical
data of the paper. The dynamics of social capital are determined by the initial network
range and firm performance: the better the initial network and firm performance the less
the likelihood of increase in various elements of entrepreneurs’ social capital.
KEY WORDS: dynamics, entrepreneurial networks, Russia
BACKGROUND
             In  his  seminal  essay,  Granovetter  (1985)  postulated  that  actions  of  economic
agents are embedded in concrete, ongoing systems of social relations and these relations
facilitate and constrain agents’ profit and rent seeking actions. Social capital defined as
networks of relationships and assets located in these networks (Bourdieu, 1986, Burt,
1997a, Coleman, 1988) has been found positively influencing firm performance (Baker,
1990), product innovation (Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998), and industry-wide network formation
(Walker, Kogut & Shan, 1997). Similarly, social capital of individuals facilitates job and
status attainment (Lin, Ensel, & Vaughn, 1981, Marsden & Hurlbert, 1988), enhances
individual’s power (Krackhardt, 1990) and career mobility (Podolny & Baron, 1997), and
impacts CEO compensation (Belliveau, O’Reilly III, & Wade, 1996). Research on
personal networks of entrepreneurs revealed that entrepreneurs perceive and exploit
business opportunities in disconnected networks (Burt, 1992), obtain information, advice
and social support from network alters (Aldrich & Zimmer, 1986, Birley, 1985, Nohria,4
1992), control and manage exchange structures through network dyads (Larson, 1992),
access financial capital (Shane & Cable, 1999), and get an endorsement from prestigious
players to influence perceptions of the quality of their ventures (Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels,
1999).
On the other hand, there is growing empirical evidence that the social
embeddedness has a negative aspect: tightly controlled relationships reinforce obligations
and expectations that may limit freedom of economic agents to recognize and exploit new
opportunities (Light & Isralowitz, 1997, Podolny & Page, 1998). Previously instrumental
relationships may turn into “dark resources” that constrain rent seeking activities of
entrepreneurs affecting negatively their sales and other performance indicators (Bean &
Bell-Rose, 1999, Portes, 1995). The bulk of the empirical research on social capital, thus,
has been devoted to the aspect of instrumental utilisation of personal networks (Portes,
1998) and increasingly the “dark side” of social relations for entrepreneurship.
While understanding how social capital of economic agents does influence the
outcome of their actions is vital, the explaining and decoding of how personal networks
of entrepreneurs develop and evolve over time is crucial for entrepreneurial
sustainability. Despite its practical and academic importance, the theme has attracted a
very little attention of management researchers (Johannisson, 1996, Steier, 2000). In this
paper, I examine the dynamics of entrepreneurs’ personal networks over time and assess
the impacts of such indicators as initial network range, firm performance and social status
of entrepreneurs on the development and evolution of social networks of entrepreneurs.
The context of the study is a large transition economy - the Russian Federation. Since
Russia is going through unparalleled social and economic changes, the country’s context5
is an appropriate research site for testing of research hypotheses on network dynamics of
entrepreneurs. In the present study, I argue that entrepreneurial performance and original
network range of entrepreneurs have significant impacts on the changes in structural,
relational and resource parameters of networks whereas social origin does not affect
network dynamics.
I seek to make two contributions to the research literature: First, by applying the
embeddedness argument and social capital theory developed and tested in the Western
social environment to the Russian reality, I expand the paradigm boundary to formerly
communist societies. Second, I examine the dynamics of personal networks of
entrepreneurs over time and explain the factors that determine structural, relational and
resource changes of entrepreneurs’ personal networks - an important but neglected area in
network research and entrepreneurial studies.
Resources of individuals defined as valuable assets possessed by persons and
embedded in social networks constitute the fundamental linkage between actors’
purposive actions and their outcomes, e.g., entrepreneurial entry and exit (Abell, 1996).
The pattern of dispersion of various resources among individuals at a given moment in
time is a function of social structure (Stinchcombe, 1965). Different resources including
knowledge and social resources are dispersed unevenly across the hierarchical as well as
segmented groups in society (Anheier, Gerhards & Romo, 1995, Hayek, 1945). The
volume of resources possessed by an individual or groups is contingent on the overall
position of that individual or group in the social space. This uneven resource dispersion
across social groups and individuals is referred to the resource heterogeneity of social
actors. Economic agents including entrepreneurs are heterogeneous in terms of network6
range (Burt, 1983b), relations and contact resources (Lai, Lin & Leung, 1998). The
resource heterogeneity forms the set of constraints that governs the functioning of society
in a durable way determining the chances of success for instrumental actions of
individuals (Bourdieu, 1986).
Social embeddedness is a dynamic continuous process as much as stable
exchange relations. Social capital of entrepreneurs, therefore, evolves and develops over
time as a function of venture life-cycle (Steier, 2000), industry and geographic region
(Johannisson, 1996).
At the start-up stage of new venturing entrepreneurs are likely to seek out actively
investors and business angels for capital, and their networking strategy will focus more
on capital providers such as business angels (Steier, 2000). With new venture growth
structural composition, relational content and resource volumes of networks will change:
networks are likely to contain more clients and suppliers rather than initial investors; new
investors are likely to be those with greater financial resources than initial investors;
business relationships become more and more formal and institutionalised in contrast to
initial informal relations based on individual acquaintances. Networks of failing
entrepreneurs are likely to disintegrate, and the process may force them to adapt a
different networking strategy.
Structural and other parameters of industries may produce particular networking
patterns of entrepreneurs: retail trade firms are likely to have numerous and disconnected
clients that make them less dependent on a certain client in contrast to manufacturing
firms that usually have a few key clients upon whom their revenue depends. Urban
entrepreneurs are likely to have more dynamic networks due to large pools of potential7
contacts whereas rural entrepreneurs may have less dynamic but stable networks due to
the limited population of potential alters.
The dynamics of social capital are path-dependent (Granovetter, 1990, Stark,
1996). Those with higher initial social position are likely to have more high status and
resource rich players in their network, and these network clusters may function as closed
societies such as the Oxbridge network – “the old boys network” in England.
Arguably, venture development and entrepreneur development is a co-
evolutionary process where entrepreneur influences firm performance as much as firm
performance affects attributes of entrepreneurs such as experience, tacit knowledge or
resource acquisition skills. While relatively successful entrepreneurs may adapt
conservative or persistent networking behaviour (Aldrich, 1982), those that under
perform may pursue more expansionist networking as a learning effect from successful
peers. In this perspective, entrepreneurial performance may have a major effect on the
dynamics of entrepreneurial social capital.
Sociologists elaborated three dimensions of individual’s social capital: structural
embeddedness - the structure of the overall network of relations, relational embeddedness
- the extent to which economic actions are affected by the quality of actors’ personal
relations (Granovetter, 1990: 98), and cognitive embeddedness - the degree to which an
individual shares common code and systems of meaning with a community or collective
(Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998: 244). Fourth dimension of social capital may be articulated
as  resource embeddedness - the degree to which network ties contain valuable
instrumental resources (Lai et al, 1998, Lin & Dumin, 1986, Marsden & Hurlbert, 1988).
The resource embeddedness has been referred to “the material quality of ties” (Uzzi,8
1996: 675), and it is a function of attributes and characteristics of individual alters, e.g.,
high status contact versus low status contact (Ibarra, 1993). In this study, I focus upon
structural embeddedness, relational embeddedness and resource embeddedness of
entrepreneurs’ social capital.
I operationalize structural embeddedness as network range that include network
size, heterophily (Burt, 1983b) and homophily. Network size is defined as the number of
direct ties involving individual units (Burt, 1983b, Marsden, 1990, Moore, 1990).
Network heterophily refers to the degree which an ego network contains diverse alters,
e.g., demographic characteristics or occupational status (Burt, 1983b, Ibarra, 1993,
Marsden, 1987, Renzulli, Aldrich & Moody, 1999). Network homophily is conceptualized
as the extent to which pairs of alters in a network are similar in various attributes
including occupational (Ibarra, 1992, 1993).
Relational embeddedness has been interpreted as relational content (Burt, 1983a,
1997b, Podolny & Baron, 1997), tie strength (Marsden & Campbell, 1984), and relational
trust (Galunic & Moran, 1999, Tsai & Ghoshal, 1998). I operationalize relational
embeddedness as “the friendship domain” indicating strong ties and “the acquaintance
domain” indicating weak ties (Burt, 1983a, Krackhardt, 1992, Lin & Dumin, 1986).
Lai et al operationalized resource embeddedness as contact’s resource
characteristics that are contingent upon occupational status, authority position, and core
versus peripheral sector (Lai et al, 1998). I operationalize resource embeddedness as the
extent to which an egocentric network is comprised of actors of high socioeconomic
status and the extent to which entrepreneurs have been able to marshal financial and
material resources from their personal networks.9
THE RUSSIAN CONTEXT
The instrumental use of personal connections characterized Soviet society at its
core.  Blat – the system of informal contacts has served as an alternative social
mechanism for overcoming rigidities in Soviet factory’s production and supply practices
(Berliner, 1957) and obtaining consumer goods and services under the rationing system
that characterized the Soviet economy (Ledeneva, 1998). The scale of informal ties and
resources located in these networks were dependent on the political power of social
actors (Shkaratan & Figatner, 1992). The transition to market economy, however, has
changed fundamentally the way Russians build personal networks and utilize them for
business and personal goals (Kosova, 1999, Ledeneva, 1998). Radaev, a leading Russian
sociologist, said in an interview: “During the Soviet period Russians built and used
personal networks partly to survive and partly to help each other (vyruchit’). But now the
way people network in this country is becoming more and more quid pro quid. The
material reciprocity and rational calculations about contacts’ resources are the main
selection factor for network recruitment. In other words, people are becoming more and
more systematic in their networking strategy and pay much attention to recruit resource
rich and powerful contacts in their personal networks” (Author’s interview, May 1999,
Moscow). This indicates that personal networks of Russian entrepreneurs are more
turbulent and dynamic in comparison to entrepreneurial networks in relatively stable
market economies such as the West.
Based upon the logic of social embeddedness and assumptions on the network
dynamics, I propose a number of empirical hypotheses.10
HYPOTHESES
Network Dynamics
Original Network Range. The dynamics of personal networks of entrepreneurs are
a function of the original state of networks (Burt, 1992, Johannisson, 1996, Steier, 2000,
Uzzi, 1997). As network clusters evolve, friends of friends begin to be included and that
expands cluster boundaries to contacts in other clusters pushing the size of ego networks
further. Third-party referrals and past relationships bring in new ties to the cluster and
this shapes the original network range, relations and resource configurations. As a
venture develops, entrepreneurs focus on the quality of the network composition such as
nonredundancy or heterophily changing their network morphology (Steier, 2000).
H1a. The greater the original network range the greater the increase in
structural elements of entrepreneurs’ networks.
H1b. The greater the original network range, the greater the increase in
relational elements of entrepreneurs’ networks.
H1c. The greater the original network range the greater the increase in
resources of entrepreneur’s networks.
Original Occupational Status. It is assumed that original social position of
entrepreneurs, i.e., family background or status of first job, may be associated with
patterns of change in networks: higher structural location within the social hierarchy
enables them to screen better potential ties and recruit more diverse and resource-rich
contacts (Lin, 1990). Prestigious location itself makes more attractive to other people,
easing the network expanding effort (Burt, 1992: 23). In this perspective, the status of the
original position may predict network development of entrepreneurs.
H2a. The higher the original social status the greater the increase in structural
elements of entrepreneurs' networks.11
H2b. The higher the original social status the greater the increase in relational
elements of entrepreneurs’ networks.
H2c. The higher the original social status the greater the increase in
resourcefulness of entrepreneur’s networks.
Firm Performance and Structural Dynamics of Networks. I predict the converse
relationship between firm performance and changes in structural features of networks.
Successful entrepreneurs are likely to be persistent in their networking since their
networks are already sizeable and heterophilous providing profitable economic
exchanges (Aldrich, 1982). Opportunistic entrepreneurs are likely to manage better the
tension between network growth and effectiveness since efficiency may decline with the
increase in size (Burt, 1992: 24). Less successful entrepreneurs may deliberately search
out new alters to expand their opportunity horizons.
H3a. The better the firm performance the less the increase in network size of
entrepreneurs.
H3b.  The better the firm performance the less the increase in network
heterophily of entrepreneurs.
H3c. The better the firm performance the less the increase in network homophily
of entrepreneurs.
Firm Performance and Relational Dynamics of Networks. Changes in strong and
weak ties are affected inversely by entrepreneurial performance. Making most out of
spotted opportunities in networks will pressurize friendship ties resulting in either friends
fleeing or excluding friends from business dealings. Past fruitful relationships
precondition turning of previously weak ties into strong ties, and those weak ties that are
instrumentally useless are likely to be dumped. Entrepreneurs who are lagging behind
will try to develop strong ties with key clients and suppliers and intentionally keep many12
new and old relationships weak to preserve the structural autonomy for opportunistic
behaviour. Ethnographic studies in Russia confirm that entrepreneurs exclude their
friends from deals and keep a distance with acquaintances (Ledeneva, 1998: 196, 200).
H4a. The better the firm performance the less the increase in strong ties of
entrepreneurs.
H4b. The better the firm performance the less the increase in weak ties of
entrepreneurs.
Firm Performance and Resource Dynamics of Networks. Wealthy, powerful and
prestigious actors are few and likely to reside centrally in clusters of successful
entrepreneurs. These clusters are likely to have clear boundaries to protect relationships
from opportunistic poachers from less resourceful clusters. Failing entrepreneurs,
therefore, will have a moderate success in poaching of resourceful contacts. The
perception of under performance also makes them unattractive to resource-rich alters
such as venture capitalists and bankers perpetuating the vicious circle of being at the
bottom. Well-do firms are likely to use formal and informal channels for additional
finance since they are financially solvent in contrast to failing firms that are likely to seek
more and cheaper financial resources from informal sources.
H5a. The better the firm performance the less the increase in network
resourcefulness of entrepreneurs.
H5b. The better the firm performance the less the increase in mobilized
resources of entrepreneurs.
METHODOLOGY
Sample and Data Collection
The empirical data of the study is composed of the face-to-face interviews with 75
Russian entrepreneurs in February-June 1995, and the follow-up interviews with 5613
original respondents in March-May 1999. Pilot interviews with six Moscow firms were
conducted in August 1994.
In three Russian cities, viz., Moscow, Ekaterinburg and Pterozavodsk, I selected
firms on the basis of a stratified random sampling procedure. The computerised database
of registered businesses of the Moscow City Committee of Statistics, Business Assistance
Centre of the Sverdlovsk Regional Administration in Ekaterinburg, and the State
Committee of Statistics of the Republic of Karelia in Petrozavodsk were used as
sampling populations. I created twelve lists of firms (four industries and three sizes) each
of which contained twenty firm names.
Banks were classified in accordance with the following criteria: small charter
funds < US$50 000, medium charter funds US$50 001-250 000, and large charter funds >
US$250 001. This grouping was confirmed in interviews with Russian experts and
Central bank officials. A similar classification has been established in another study of
Russian banks (Lapidus & van de Waal-Palms, 1997). In manufacturing and the resource
sector, firms were grouped: small – < 100 employees, medium - 101-500 employees, and
large - > 501 employees. Trade firms were classified: small - < 50 employees, medium –
51-200 employees, and large - > 201 employees. The classification is based on the
definition of small firms in the Russian law and discussions with Russian experts
(Rossiiskaya federatsiya, 1995).
Every second firm on these lists was selected for contact. In 1995, 120
entrepreneurs were contacted and 82 agreed to be interviewed. The response rate was 68
percent. 7 respondents were discovered as ineligible in the field, so that the final sample
consisted of 75 entrepreneurs and directors. There were 50 new ventures and 2514
privatized companies. Interviews were conducted with a specially designed questionnaire
that contained questions on entrepreneurial networks and firm characteristics. The
follow-up study in 1999 concentrated on network dynamics and firm performance. I re-
interviewed 56 original respondents.
---------------------------------
Insert Table 1 and 2 about here
----------------------------------
Financial data was collected from firms as well as other sources such as the
Central Bank of Russia, Association of Russian Banks, the Foundation for Small
Business Development in three cities, and local tax offices. About a half of the sample
firms provided annual reports that contained accounting information. In most occasions,
financial directors or chief accountants were interviewed additionally on financial issues.
Accounting data in Roubles have been deflated by the year’s average exchange rate of
US$ and Russian Roubles published in The Economist. The reliability and consistency of
company financial statements still remains questionable in Russia although significant
progress has been made for the last few years to bring Russian accounting practices in the
line with the Western standard.
Independent Variables
There are three independent variables in this paper that are assumed to influence
the dynamics of personal networks of entrepreneurs: Original network range, original
occupational status and firm performance.
Original network range. Network size is measured by the number of ties
indicated by entrepreneurs. I presented a table where twelve types of occupations (high
rank official in ministries and agencies, middle and low rank official in ministries and
agencies, high rank official in local governments, middle and low rank official in local15
governments, managers of large banks, managers of medium and small banks, managers
of large manufacturing plants, managers of medium and small manufacturing plants,
managers of large trade firms, managers of medium and small trade firms, managers
large resource sector firms, and managers of medium and small resource sector firms)
were listed in rows, and two types of tie strength (friendship and acquaintances) were
placed in columns (Lin & Dumin, 1986). I asked the respondents to indicate how many
people were in each cell. This table was used in 1995 interviews and the follow-up
interviews in 1999 to capture the egocentric network size and its dynamics.
Network heterophily measures the degree to which an egocentric network contains
alters from different sectors, i.e., positions in ministries and local governments, banking,
trade, manufacturing, and the resource sector. It is measured as the proportion of contacts
from other industries.
Network homophily is measured as the percentage of contacts from the same
industry.
Original occupational status. Status of first job is scaled as low status denoted
“one”, middle status denoted “two”, and high status denoted “three”. Those who started
as workers and peasants were categorized as low status, and those who started in
intelligentsia were regarded as middle status, and those who started in party and state
bureaucracy were categorized as high status.
Firm performance. Organisational performance may be measured in various
ways (March & Sutton, 1997, Meyer, 1994). In this paper, firm performance is measured
by sales growth, operating profit margin, and return on assets (Earle et al, 1996). Sales
growth for each year (1996, 1997 and 1998) and the average sales growth for three years16
were expressed in percentage. I use sales growth rather than sales figures because of the
mixed sample of large, medium and small firms as well as firms from four different
industries. Operating profit margin (PM) for each year, the average operating profit,
return on assets (ROA) for each year and the average return on assets were expressed in
percentage.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variable is network dynamics and it is measured by change in
network size, change in network heterophily, change in network homophily, change in
strong ties, change in weak ties, change in network resourcefulness, and resources
mobilized in 1999.
Change in network size is measured by the difference between network size-95
and network size-99. Change in network heterophily captures the difference between
network heterophily-95 and network heterophily-99. Change in network homophily scales
the difference between network homophily-95 and network homophily-99.
Change in strong ties is measured by the difference between strong ties-95 and
strong ties-99. Strong ties are the number of friends. Change in weak ties is measured by
the difference between weak ties-95 and weak ties-99. Weak ties capture the number of
acquaintances. I presented the Russian translations “drug” as friend and “znakomyi” as
acquaintance due to the culture sensitive nature of these concepts. It is reasonable to
assume that respondents have clearly distinguished their drug from znakomyi because of
the Russian communal traditions as well as informal exchange practices (Ledeneva,
1998).17
Change in resourcefulness is measured by the difference between
resourcefulness-95 and resourcefulness-99. Network resourcefulness captures the number
of high rank officials in ministries, high rank officials in local governments, managers of
large banks, managers of large manufacturing plants, managers of large trade firms, and
managers of large resource sector firms.
Financial resources mobilized 95 and financial resources mobilized 99 are binary
variables of one if resources were mobilized before and after 1995 interviews and zero if
resources were not mobilized.
Control Variables
Industry (banking, trade, manufacturing, and the resource sector), firm size (large,
medium and small), region (Moscow, Ekaterinburg, and Petrozavodsk) and firm origin
(new venture versus privatized) are controlled in this study. Three cities represent
Russia’s regional economic diversity well. Moscow is the financial and commercial
center whereas Ekaterinburg is famous for its heavy industry. In Petrozavodsk, the capital
city of the Republic of Karelia, the timber industry and trade is highly developed. All
control variables were turned into dummies and included in the regression analyses.
RESULTS
Descriptive Statistics
The performance indicators in Table 3 show that Russian firms performed poorly:
the average sales growth for three years was 1% (s.d. = 0.33), average profit margin was
– 22% (s.d. = 0.86), and average return on assets was – 9% (s.d. = 0.96).
------------------------------
Insert Table 3 about here
------------------------------18
The mean network size in 1995 was 34 persons (s.d. = 9.42). The mean
heterophily was 82% (s.d. = 0.06) whereas homophily was 18% (s.d. = 0.06). A typical
entrepreneur had 12 friends (s.d. = 4.7) and 22 acquaintances (s.d. = 6.5). The mean of
resource-rich ties was 16 (s.d. = 6.6), and 41% of entrepreneurs (s.d. = 0.49) had
mobilized financial resources.
The figures in Table 3 suggest that changes in all network indicators except
homophily (x = - 5, s.d. = 0.11) and strong ties (x = -6, s.d. = 5.7) are positive. Thus,
network size (x = 7.3, s.d. = 11.6), heterophily (x = 5, s.d. = 0.11), weak ties (x = 13, s.d.
= 9.69) and resourcefulness (x = 4, s.d. = 8.05) have increased over four years.
Network Dynamics
Table 4 provides the results of the multivariate regression predicting changes in
network size as a function of initial network attributes, controlling for industry, firm size,
firm origin and region. Considering the significant correlation coefficients, I included
initial network size and resourcefulness as independent variables in the regression
analysis.
                                  --------------------------------------
Insert Table 4 here
-------------------------------------
The baseline model (1) includes industry dummies, size dummies, new venture
dummy, and region dummies. Petrozavodsk dummy, resource sector dummy, medium
size dummy, and privatized firm dummy were excluded in the regression analysis
because of their overall weak contribution to the model. Model 1 is not significant. Model
2 shows that initial network size (B = -0.77, p<0.001) is negatively related to changes in
network size, and the overall model is also significant (F = 5.40, R² = 0.44). Model 319
reveals that initial network resourcefulness (B = -0.95, p<0.001) is negatively associated
with changes in network size. The model is significant (F = 3.62, R² = 0.34). Models 2
and 3 illustrate that trade and manufacturing dummies are associated significantly and
positively with increase in network size over time. Model 4 examines the two
independent variables with size, new venture and region dummies. The model indicates
that network size (B = - 0.96, p<0.05) and new venture dummy (B = -6.13, p<0.05) have
strong negative impacts on network size increase. The overall model is significant (F =
3.28, p<0.05).
----------------------------------
Insert Table 5 about here
---------------------------------
Table 5 presents the results of regression analysis predicting network dynamics
(other than size) as a function of initial networks and original occupational status,
controlling for industry, firm size, and firm origin. Region dummies were excluded in
regressions because of their weak contributions to the model. Model 1 demonstrates that
initial network heterophily (B = -1.04, p<0.01) has a significant but negative impact on
changes in heterophily, and the model is significant (F = 7.24, R² = 0.51). Model 2 shows
that network homophily (B = -1.04, p<0.001) is negatively associated with increase in
homophily, and the model is also significant (F = 7.24, R² = 0.51). Models 3 and 4 report
that network size (B = -0.47, p<0.01) and resourcefulness (B = -0.55, p<0.001) negatively
affect changes in strong ties. Both models are significant (F = 8.71, R² = 0.56, F = 4.35,
R² = 0.38).
Models 5, 6 and 7 in Table 5 reveal that network size (B = -0.36, p<0.01),
resourcefulness (B = -0.59, p<0.001), and occupational status (B = -0.02, p<0.5) are20
negatively associated with changes in resourcefulness. Model 5 (F = 3.19, R² = 0.31) and
model 6 (F = 3.88, R² = 0.36) are significant whereas model 7 is not. Model 8 indicates
that network size (B = 0.01, p<0.05) is associated positively with resources mobilized 99,
and the model is significant (F = 2.29, R² = 0.25).
Among control variables, trade and manufacturing dummies are significantly
correlated to changes in network variables, and all associations except change in
heterophily are positive.
-------------------------------
Insert Table 6 about here
-------------------------------
Table 6 provides the results of regression analysis predicting network dynamics as
a function of firm performance, controlling for industry and firm size. Models 1 and 2
demonstrate that the average sales growth (B = -11.11, p<0.5) and return on assets 98 (B
= -2.34, p<0.5) negatively affect increase in network size although both models are
insignificant. Model 3 reveals that the average profit margin (B = -0.03, p<0.5) has a
significant but negative impact on changes in network heterophily, and the model is
significant (F = 3.03, p<0.5). Model 4 shows that the average profit margin (B = 0.03,
p<0.5) is positively correlated to change in homophily, and the model is significant (F =
3.03, p<0.5). Models 5, 6 and 7 indicate that the average sales growth (B = -10.78,
p<0.5), sales growth 97 (B= -6.16, p<0.5), and sales growth 98 (B = --6.68, p<0.5)
negatively affect changes in weak ties although all three models are insignificant. Models
8 and 9 confirm that sales growth 98 (B = -6.16, p<0.5) and the average sales growth (B
= -7.04, p<0.5) do influence negatively increase in network resourcefulness, and the
models are insignificant.21
DISCUSSION
The decline in number of friends is consistent with the general trend of declining
trust in interpersonal relationships among the Russians (Ledeneva, 1998: 195). It may be
speculated that taking advantage of spotted opportunities in friendship ties pressurizes
relationships that result in friends’ flee (Burt, 1992). An alternative explanation for the
finding may be that entrepreneurs become calculative and less friendly species over time
due to the time pressure and work overload.
The decreased homophily in entrepreneurs’ network reveals that as business
develops various needs rise, and these needs force entrepreneurs to diversify their
personal and business networks.
Original network range predicts network changes in a reverse manner: the greater
the original network range the less the increase in structural, relational and resource
elements of entrepreneurs’ networks. The hypotheses H1a, H1b and H1c are not
affirmative. This finding suggests that there is a ceiling effect on network dynamics: the
actual number of ties that could be managed by a person limits the absolute number of
contacts in any personal networks.
Original occupational status has a limited explanatory power for network
dynamics. Although the variable affects significantly and negatively changes in
resourcefulness, the overall finding does not support hypotheses H2a, H2b and H2c. The
evidence demonstrates that initial high status does not provide advantages in network
building, and structural barriers, therefore, do not hamper active networking. The finding
that the higher the original social status the less the increase in resourcefulness seems to
suggest that high status entrepreneurs already do possess resource-rich networks, and22
therefore, they are conservative in networking whereas low status entrepreneurs seem to
seek out resource-rich contacts.
Industry may predict network changes: trade and manufacturing entrepreneurs
increased their network range. The nature of trading that the greater the number of
acquaintances the greater the number of potential buyers and suppliers who are socially
bound seems to be the case in Russia. The finding on manufacturing may be country-
specific: Russian manufacturing plants are hugely indebted and inter-enterprise arrears
are prevalent, and therefore, many entrepreneurs deliberately look for new and better
clients and business partners.
Entrepreneurial performance has differentiated effects on structural changes in
networks: increase in size and heterophily are conversely affected by performance
whereas homophily is positively affected by performance. Hypotheses H3a and H3b are
confirmed, and hypothesis 3c is not supported. The assumption that performance success
motivates entrepreneurs to preserve their networks (size and heterophily) whereas failure
leads to more active networking seems to have some empirical ground in Russia at least.
The evidence that average profit margin predicts homophily increase suggests those who
buy at cheaper prices and sell at higher margins network more actively with
entrepreneurs of the same industry because of the information and other benefits about
the market dynamics.
Sales growth predicts decrease in weak ties while strong ties are unaffected.
Hypothesis H4a is not affirmative but hypothesis H4b is confirmed. Successful
entrepreneurs may stick to their old embedded weak ties whereas less successful ones
recruit more and more weak ties to create new opportunities.23
The findings on the relationship between firm performance and resource
dynamics of networks are mixed: hypothesis H5a is supported whereas hypothesis H5b is
not confirmed. Well-do entrepreneurs do not “chase” resource-rich new ties whereas
those who are lagging behind enrich their social capital by engaging in relationships with
powerful alters. Sales growth or higher profit margin does not affect the volume of
mobilized resources.
CONCLUSION
The dynamics of social capital is determined by the initial state of personal
networks and firm performance: the better the initial network and firm performance the
less the likelihood of increase in various elements of entrepreneurs’ social capital.
Successful entrepreneurs are more likely to conserve their networks whereas less
successful ones are likely expand their personal networks.
Several limitations should be emphasized. The sample size is relatively small, and
therefore, one should be cautious of over-generalization of the results. The research site is
Russia, which is going through simultaneous social, economic and political crises, and
therefore, this limits the generalizability of the findings to more stable Western societies.
The research implies that further research should focus on how
persistent/conservative networking behaviour of successful entrepreneurs affects firms’
performance over time. The practical implication is that entrepreneurs should be aware of
the influences of firm performance or venture life-cycle on their social behaviour such as
networking.24
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TABLE 1
The Number of Entrepreneurs Interviewed in 1995
Industry
Banking Trade Manufac. Resource
sector
Total
Moscow 7 9 12 2 30
Size:
Large 6431 1 4
Medium 1221 6
Small -37- 1 0
Ekaterinburg 10 4 6 3 23
Size:
Large 4141 1 0
Medium 2111 5
Small 4211 8
P e t r o z a v o d s k 5845 2 2
Size:
Large 1113 6
Medium 2522 1 1
Small 221- 5
Total
22 21 22 10 75
TABLE 2
Follow-up Interviews in 1999




Left the country 2
Hiding from criminal charges 2
Unreachable 2
Not in Business: 7









Means, Standard Deviations and Pearson’s Correlations
V a r i a b l e s M S D 123456
1 Network size 34.4 9.42
2 Change in network
size
7.3 11.6 -.52¶
3 Network heterophily 0.82 0.06 .06 -.03
4 Change in network
heterophily
0.05 0.11 -.05 -.10 -.61¶
5 Network homophily 0.18 0.06 -.06 .03 -1¶ .61¶
6 Change in network
homophily
-0.05 0.11 .05 .10 .61¶ -1¶ -.61¶
7 Strong ties 12 4.70 .78¶ -.48* .04 -.00 -.04 .00
8 Change in strong ties -6 5.70 -.66¶ .56¶ -.03 -.02 .03 .02
9 Weak ties 22 6.44 .89¶ -.40¶ .05 -.10 -.05 .10
10 Change in weak ties 13 9.69 -.23 .87¶ -.01 -.11 .01 .11
11 Resourcefulness 16 6.6 .88¶ -.46¶ .07 -.03 -.07 .03
12 Change in
resourcefulness
4 8.05 -.39¶ .72¶ -.17 .01 .17 -.01
13 Resources mobilized
95
0.41 0.49 .18 -.02 .15 -.10 -.15 .10
14 Resources mobilized
99
0.30 0.46 .33* .03 -.01 -.19 .01 .19
15 Occupational status 1.9 0.81 .48¶ -.19 -.06 -.15 .06 .15
16 Sales growth 96 0.19 0.58 .08 -.21 -.07 -.10 .07 .10
17 Sales growth 97 0.04 0.37 -.06 -.21 .08 -.12 -.08 .12
18 Sales growth 98 -0.19 0.43 .20 -.22 -.12 .13 .12 -.13
19 Average sales growth 0.01 0.33 .11 -.30* -.06 -.05 .06 .05
20 Profit margin 95 -0.32 2.66 -.04 .01 -.05 .02 .05 -.02
21 Profit margin 96 -0.32 1.85 -.05 -.02 .01 -.10 -.01 .10
22 Profit margin 97 -0.71 3.23 -.10 .03 -.10 -.05 .10 .05
23 Profit margin 98 -0.46 1.16 .27 -.14 .26 -.24 -.26 .24
24 Average profit
margin
-0.22 0.86 .04 -.07 .15 -.34* -.15 .34*
25 Return on assets 95 0.13 0.83 -.04 -.03 .25 -.24 -.25 .24
26 Return on assets 96 0.02 1.01 .12 -.13 .13 -.17 -.13 .17
27 Return on assets 97 -0.13 0.99 .16 -.14 .08 -.13 -.08 .13
28 Return on assets 98 -0.40 1.40 .29* -.28* -.01 -.01 .01 .01
29 Average return on
assets
-0.09 0.96 .17 -.20 .10 -.13 -.10 .1330
TABLE 3
Means, Standard Deviations and Pearson’s Correlations (Con’t)
Variables 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
8 Change in strong
ties
-.83¶
9 Weak ties .41¶ -.36¶
10 Change in weak
ties
-.09 .09 -.28*
11 Resourcefulness .61¶ -.54¶ .84¶ -.24
12 Change in
resourcefulness
-.22 .31* -.40¶ .73¶ -.46¶
13 Resources
mobilized 95
.10 -.15 .19 .05 .17 -.12
14 Resources
mobilized 99
.20 -.07 .34¶ .08 .16 .02 .23
15 Occupational
status
.25 -.26* .52¶ -.76 .51¶ -.27* .40¶ .41¶
16 Sales growth 96 .08 -.18 .05 -.14 .01 -.03 .17 -.02 .10
17 Sales growth 97 -.16 .13 .02 -.34* -.09 -.25 .17 .08 .26 .32*
18 Sales growth 98 .00 .01 .29* -.28* .27* -.37¶ .35* .15 .44¶ .03 .48¶
19 Average sales
growth
-.00 -.05 .16 -.34* .09 -.28* .32* .09 .35¶ .72¶ .78¶
20 Profit margin 95 -.15 .17 .05 -.09 -.03 -.07 -.13 .10 .19 -.06 .27*
21 Profit margin 96 -.13 .05 .01 -.05 -.09 -.01 -.17 .16 .10 .16 .23
22 Profit margin 97 -.19 .17 -.02 -.06 -.14 -.04 -.23 .18 .19 .06 .32*
23 Profit margin 98 .09 -.20 .33* -.05 .20 -.19 .03 .29* .26 -.06 .20
24 Average profit
margin
-.02 -.13 .07 -.01 -.08 -.06 -.10 .25 .14 .22 .20
25 Return on assets
95
-.00 -.06 -.06 -.00 -.06 -.11 .17 .04 .12 -.03 .13
26 Return on assets
96
.07 -.17 .13 -.06 .06 -.15 .21 .17 .17 .15 .17
27 Return on assets
97
.06 -.12 .18 -.22 .07 -.21 .18 .17 .21 .19 .34*
28 Return on assets
98
.17 -.24 .29* -.20 .20 -.04 .21 .25 .18 .18 .20
29 Average return
on assets
.09 -.17 .17 -.14 .09 -.18 .21 .19 .19 .14 .2331
TABLE 3
Means, Standard Deviations and Pearson’s Correlations (Con’t)












.15 .22 .83¶ .87¶
23 Profit margin
98
.30* .16 .18 .36¶ .26
24 Average
profit margin
-.05 .19 .40¶ .82¶ .87¶ .62¶
25 Return on
assets 95
.25 .14 .24 .24 .19 .32* .28*
26 Return on
assets 96
.24 .26 .21 .32* .22 .46¶ .41¶ .82¶
27 Return on
assets 97
.39¶ .41¶ .14 .24 .25 .47¶ .47¶ .75¶ .87¶
28 Return on
assets 98









Regression Analysis Predicting Increase in Network Size as Function of Initial Networks
(N=56)


































































Model F 0.78 5.40‡ 3.62¶ 3.28*
R² 0.11 0.44 0.34 0.35
Values represent unstandardized coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < .05
¶ p < .01
‡ p < .00133
TABLE 5






Change in strong ties Change in resourcefulness Resources
mobilized
99


































































































































Model F 7.24¶ 7.24‡ 8.71‡ 4.35¶ 3.19¶ 3.88¶ 1.27 2.29*
R² 0.51 0.51 0.56 0.38 0.31 0.36 0.15 0.25
Values represent unstandardized coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < .05
¶ p < .01
‡ p < .00134
TABLE 6
































































































































































Model F 1.15 0.88 3.03* 3.03* 1.49 1.41 1.04 1.96 1.68
R² 0.13 0.10 0.27 0.29 0.16 0.15 0.12 0.20 0.18
Values represent unstandardized coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses.
* p < .05
¶p < .01
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